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Abstract
The paper focuses on trade between two countries where a vertically differentiated
commodity is produced by asingle firmin each country, operating initially in autarkic conditions.
It is assumed that the two countries have overlapping income distributions, giving thus rise,
under certain conditions, to two-way trade, i.e., a proper intraindustry trade. It emerges that
while consumers always benefit from trade, especially if two-way trade arises, firms may have
conflicting preferences on the choice between (i) autarky and trade, as well as (ii) one-way trade
and two-way trade.
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1. Introduction
The role of product differentiation and different consumer preferences across countries
have been first advocated as two major factors explaining intraindustry trade between developed
countries by Linder (1961). He argued that the priciples governing trade in manufactured goods
differ from those at the basis of trade in primary goods. While accepting the idea that trade in
basic goods is determined by factor endowments, he put into question the notion that factor
endowments are the main determinants of trade in manufactured items. Linder highlighted
instead the role of demand, stressing that usually a large intraindustry trade occurs between
developed countries which have comparable factor endowments or relatively easy access to
endowments available in third countries, that according to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory we might
not expect to observe. Then, a cause of trade other than factor endowment must be identified.
According to Linder, a manufactured good is produced by an entrepreneur in response to
a perceived demand, which can be determined by the interaction of preferences and income.
The role of preferences in explaining intraindustry trade has been largely investigated in several
contributions resorting to the Chamberlinian approach (Krugman, 1979; Helpman, 1981;
Markusen, 1981, to mention only a few). Lancaster (1979, 1980) has introduced this issue in
the context of the address approach. The role of income as a determinant of trade flows has been
emphasized by Hunter and Markusen (1987). In a different context, Shaked and Sutton (1984)
have described the effect of free trade on the extent of vertical differentiation and the equilibrium
number of firms able to gain positive profits after the liberalization of trade.
The issue of North-South trade in vertically differentiated products has been focused upon
by Flam and Helpman (1987). They propose a model where two countries are endowed with
production technologies characterized by different levels of efficiency. The authors show that
the advanced country produces the top quality goods while the other supplies and exports the
1
low quality goods.1 A dramatic change in the pattern of production and trade may be observed
if technical progress is faster in the South than in the North. More recently, Motta (1992) has
analysed a duopolistic model of trade in vertically differentiated goods between two countries
which differ in size, showing that under certain conditions the small country may loose from
trade liberalization. Here I want to focus on the interplay between preferences and income on
one side and vertical differentiation on the other side as determinants of intraindustry trade
between two countries characterized by different income distributions as well as consumer
densities, extending the analysis carried out in Lambertini and Rossini (1994). The model I
adopt shares many features with the one in Motta, Thisse and Cabrales (1995), though they
address a completely different question, namely, whether a country that, under autarky, produces
a good whose quality is lower than that of the good produced in the other country, can catch up
after trade liberalization. They show that, when trade opens, two possible equilibria may arise.
In the first, the high-quality firm maintains its leadership, while in the second, leapfrogging is
observed. The latter event is possible only if the initial quality gap is not excessively large. These
results hold for both integrated and segmented markets.
I shall assume that the product variety offered by each firm is first determined under
autarky. When trade opens, provided that quality cannot be changed due to a sunk cost, firms
adjust their respective prices in order to compete in the international market. I adopt the
hypothesis that markets are integrated, i.e., firms cannot price-discriminate by charging different
prices in the two countries. This may be due to the possibility of arbitrage by consumers or to
the existence of legal constraints. The two alternative cases of one-way and two-way trade are
described. These settings are first assumed a priori; then, the conditions leading to the arising
of one kind of trade or the other are assessed. The results obtained throughout the paper point
1. This is also confirmed by the empirical literature available, according to which poor
countries usually specialize in the production of low-quality goods. See, inter alia, Tharakan
(1984); Tharakan, Kerstens and Glejser (1994).
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to a main consideration, namely that while free trade is generally preferable to autarky from a
social standpoint, the choice between one and two-way trade essentially depends on the
preferences of the high-quality firm, and a proper form of intraindustry trade may benefit the
high-quality firm if the income difference between the consumers in the two countries is not
too wide, while is not necessarily preferred to simple one-way trade by the firm located in the
poor country, that is specialized in the production of a low-quality good, unless her home market
is very poor as compared to the foreign one. Neat conclusions can be reached as far as consumer
surplus and social welfare are concerned. Under this respect, two-way trade is generally preferred
to one-way trade by both countries.
The paper is structured in the following way. The basic model is introduced in section 2.
Section 3 describes the autarkic regime. Then, sections 3 and 4 deal with the alternative settings
of one-way trade and two-way trade, respectively. The issue of the choice between the two free
trade regimes is tackled in section 5. Sections 6 through 8 contain a comparative evaluation of
the results. Finally, section 9 provides concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.
2. The model
Label the two countries as A and B, respectively. In each country, consumers are
characterized by a marginal willingness to pay for quality θ and are uniformly distributed with
density si over the interval i=A,B, with The latter assumption means that country
A is at least as rich as country B, in that the marginal willingness to pay of the richer consumer
living in country A is not lower than that of the richest consumer in country B. The global
dimension of each market is given by and I assume that with n>0, so that we
shall say that country A is larger than country B if n>1. Each consumer buys at most one unit
of the product if and only if the net surplus he gets from consumption is non negative:
[0, θi], θA ≥ θB.
siθi, sAθA = nsBθB,
U = θq − p ≥ 0, (1
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where q is the quality of the good and p the price at which it is sold.
On the supply side, one firm is active in each country under autarky, offering a good whose
production requires a fixed cost which is convex in quality:
Variable costs are assumed away. This hypothesis may be given the following justification:
quality can be thought of as the result of investments in R&D, whose size is increasing in the
quality level of the good being supplied, while it is completely unrelated to the scale of
production. It could easily be shown that the introduction of a constant unit variable cost would
not modify significantly the results that I am going to derive in the following sections.
Consequently, it can be normalised to zero without loss of generality.2 Finally, I shall assume
that fixed costs are sunk, implying that firms choose quality once and for all.
3. The autarky equilibrium
Under autarky each firm operates as a monopolist in her own market. Her obective function
is
where xi is market demand, defined as follows:
F = tq 2, t > 0. (2
pii
m
= pixi − tqi
2
, i = A , B , (3
2. Instead, the assumption of variable costs increasing in quality would radically change
the picture. This setting is investigated in Lambertini and Rossini (1994).
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From the first order conditions for profit maximization w.r.t. quality and price, we have
yielding
as the optimal quantity and maximum profit. It appears thus that the monopolist always serves
the upper (or richer) half of the market.3 Besides, all equilibrium magnitudes increase as and
si increase. This implies that the monopolist will find it advantageous to improve product quality
as the marginal willingness to pay of the richest consumer increases. Analogously, she will
increase quality as consumer density increases, provided that the burden of any increase in
quality falls upon fixed costs only. These linkages between quality and marginal willingness to
pay as well as consumer density entail that the higher quality good is not necessarily being
produced in the richer country, unless it the following inequality is met:
xi =
θi −
pi
qi
si, i = A , B . (4
qi
m
=
θi
2
si
8t ; pi
m
=
θi
3
si
16t , (5
xi
m
=
θisi
2
; pii
m
=
θi
4
si
2
64t (6
θi
3. A social planner aiming at the maximization of social welfare would supply a higher
quality as compared to the profit-seeking monopolist. Furthermore, the planner would price at
marginal cost in order to serve all consumers. See Appendix A.
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Since it appears natural to think that the possibility of serving richer consumers provides an
incentive to produce a good of higher quality as compared to a market where consumers are
characterized by a lower marginal willingness to pay, in the next section I will specify the
conditions under which the above inequality holds.
As for consumer surplus, it is defined as follows:
while social welfare corresponds to the sum of consumer and producer surplus. Then,
straightforward calculations show that consumer surplus and social welfare under autarky
amount to
4. Free trade
When trade opens between the two countries, two alternative settings can emerge. In the
first, one-way trade occurs, with the firm located in country B exporting to country A. This
happens when the richest consumer in country B is located between the levels of marginal
willingness to pay associated with the consumers who are indifferent between buying either of
the two varieties (h) and between buying the low quality good or nothing (k), respectively. This
situation is depicted in Figure 1.
sA > sB

θB
θA

2
. (7
CSi
m
= si
⌠⌡p /q
θ
(θq − p )dθ, (8
CSi
m
=
θi
4
si
2
64t ; SWi
m
=
θi
4
si
2
32t . (9
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INSERT FIGURE 1
In the second, two-way trade obtains, with both qualities being purchased in both countries,
giving rise to a proper intraindustry trade. This happens when the richest consumer in country
B is located above the marginal willingness to pay of the consumer indifferent between buying
either of the two varieties (h). This situation is described by Figure 2.
INSERT FIGURE 2
Under free trade, the firm located in the richer country (A) offers a good of higher quality
as compared to the firm operating in country B (see below), so that their respective market
demands can be indexed as A and B, and are now defined as follows:
if one-way trade occurs, and
xA = (θA − h )sA; xB = (h − θB)sA + (θB − k) (sA + sB) (10
xA = (θA − θB)sA + (θB − h ) (sA + sB); xB = (h − k) (sa + sB), (11
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when two-way trade obtains; h and k, identifying the marginal willingness to pay of the
consumers indifferent between the two goods and between the low quality good and nothing at
all, are respectively:
where both qualities are fixed at the levels chosen by each firm under autarky.
As for product quality, the conditions needed for the quality of the variety being produced
in country A to be higher than that of the variety being produced in country B can be established
in the following way. Without loss of generality, set sB=1, and with
Accordingly, from (7) sA=nr obtains. This set of assumptions allows to reduce significantly the
number of parameters involved in the model and ease calculations without prejudicing the
validity of the results. Consequently, it can be stated that
i.e.,
In the remainder of the paper I shall assume that condition (14) holds. Provided that r cannot
be greater than one, the above condition implies that I shall consider if i.e., if
h =
(pA − pB)
qA − qB
; k =
pB
qB
, (12
θB = rθA, r ∈]0, 1].
qA > qB iff sAθA2 > r 2θA2 , (13
qA > qB iff n > r . (14
r ∈]0, 1] n ≥ 1,
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country A is at least as large as country B, and if instead the richer country is smaller
than the poorer one.4
The two profit functions appear now as follows:
where the superscript d stands for duopoly, and market demands xA and xB are defined as in (10)
if one-way trade occurs, or alternatively as in (11) if two-way trade is observed.
4.1. One-way trade
Assume now that trade liberalization leads to a one-way trade from the poor to the rich
country, i.e., the low-quality good is exported from the poor country (B) to the rich country (A),
while the high-quality good produced in country A is not traded. Market demands are thus given
by the expressions in (10), and after the opening of trade, firms simultaneously compete in
prices. The first order conditions (FOCs) for profit maximization are:
r ∈]0, n ]
piA
d
= pAxA − tqA
2; piB
d
= pBxB − tqB
2
, (15
∂piA1w
∂pA
=
n (θA3 r 2 − θA3 rn + 16tpA − 8tpB)
θA2 (r − n )
= 0; (16
∂piB1w
∂pB
= rθA − (1 − rn)
16tpB
r 2θA2
− (2pA − pB)
8tn
θA2 (r − n )
= 0, (17
4. Notice that these conditions are also sufficient to ensure that under autarky the profit
of firm A is at least as large as the profit of firm B as described by expression (6), since
if which is true for all
piA
m ≥ piB
m
θA
4
sA
2 ≥ θB
4
sB
2
, n ≥ r .
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where the superscript 1w stands for one-way trade. By solving the system (16-17), one gets the
following equilibrium prices:
Thus, the equilibrium quantities for the two goods can be easily calculated:
I can now focus on the distribution of surplus between producers and consumers at
equilibrium, in each country. Equilibrium profits are:
pA
1w
=
rθA
2 (n − r) (2n − 2r + 2n 2r + r 2)
8t(4n − 4r + 4n 2r − nr 2) ; (18
pB
1w
=
θA
3
r 3(n + 2) (n − r)
8t(4n − 4r + 4n 2r − nr 2) . (19
xA
1w
=
θAnr(2n − 2r + 2n 2r + r 2)
4n − 4r + 4n 2r − nr 2
; (20
xB
1w
=
θAr(2 + n ) (n − r + n 2r)
4n − 4r + 4n 2r − nr 2
. (21
piA
1w
= −θA
4
nr
2(64n 2r − 16n 3 − 32n 4r − 80nr 2 − 32n 2r 2 + 88n 3r 2 − 16n 5r 2
+32r 3 + 64nr 3 − 56n 2r 3 − 32n 3r 3 + 24n 4r 3 − 32r 4 − 8nr 4 + 32n 2r 4 + n 3r 4
+8r 5)/(64t(4n − 4r + 4n 2r − nr 2)2); (22
piB
1w
= −θA
4
r
4(32nr − 16n 2 − 32n 3 − 8n 4 + 64n 2r + 16n 3r − 32n 4r − 8n 5r − 16r 2 − 32nr 2
−16n 2r 2 + 32n 3r 2 + 24n 4r 2 + 8nr 3 − 8n 3r 3 + n 2r 4)/(64t(4n − 4r + 4n 2r − nr 2)2). (23
10
Consumer surplus in the two countries is given by:
The equilibrium values of social welfare in the two countries, and can be obtained
by summing (22) to (24) and (23) to (25), respectively. The expressions for and are
displayed in Appendix B.
4.2. Two-way trade
Consider now the setting in which both varieties are traded, i.e., not only the low-quality
good produced in country B is exported to country A, but also the high-quality good produced
in country A is made available for purchase by consumers living in country B. Demands are
now defined as in expression (11) above. As in the case of one-way trade previously treated,
after trade liberalization firms noncooperatively and simultaneously set prices. The FOCs w.r.t.
prices are:
CSA
1w
= θA
4
nr
2(4n 3 + 4n 2r + 8n 4r − 20nr 2 − 12n 2r 2 + 8n 3r 2 + 4n 5r 2 + 12r 3 + 24nr 3 − 12n 2r 3
−8n 3r 3 + 5n 4r 3 − 12r 4 − 7nr 4 + 8n 2r 4 + 3r 5)/(16t(4n − 4r + 4n 2r − nr 2)2); (24
CSB
1w
=
θA
4
r 4(n 2 − 2n + 2r − nr − 4n 2r + nr 2)2
16t(4n − 4r + 4n 2r − nr 2)2
. (25
SWA1w SWB1w,
SWA1w SWB1w
∂piA2w
∂pA
=
θA
3
r 2(r + nr − n 2 − n ) − 8tpA + 16tpB + 16tnrpA − 8tnrpB
θA2 r(r − n )
= 0; (26
∂piB2w
∂pB
=
8t(nr + 1) (2npB − rpA)
θA2 r 2(r − n )
= 0. (27
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Superscript 2w stands for two-way trade. Solving the system (26-27), one gets the Nash
equilibrium prices:
As for equilibrium quantities for the two firms, they turn out to be the following:
so that i.e., the high quality firm located in country A sells twice as much as the
low-quality firm located in country B.
By substituting prices (28-29) into the objective functions and simplifying, the equilibrium
profits under two-way trade obtain:
pA
2w
=
θA
3
nr 2(n + 1) (n − r)
4t(4n − r) (nr + 1) ; (28
pB
2w
=
θA
3
r 3(n + 1) (r − n )
8t(4n − r) (nr + 1) . (29
xA
2w
=
2θAnr(n + 1)
4n − r
; (30
xB
2w
=
θAnr(n + 1)
4n − r
, (31
xB
2w
= xA
2w/2,
piA
2w
=
θA
4
n 2r 2(40nr − 16n 2 + 64n 2r + 16n 3r − 33r 2 − 64nr 2 − 24n 2r 2 − nr 3)
64t(nr + 1) (4n − r)2 ; (32
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Furthermore, consumer surplus in the two countries amounts to
Finally, the social welfare levels in the two countries, and can be obtained by adding
(34) to (32) and (35) to (33), respectively. Both magnitudes can be found in Appendix B.
5. One or two-way trade?
Before proceeding to the comparison of the results observed under one and two-way trade
with what happens under autarky, it must be firstly established what set of relationships between
the relevant parameters of the model, i.e., n and r, can lead to one kind of trade or the other; and
it must be also taken into account that the choice between the two alternative trade regimes may
well depend upon the performance of the high-quality firm, who can decide whether to export
or not to the poor country by comparing the profits she can gain in the two settings. The factors
determining the pattern of trade and the arising of a specific kind of trade are summarized in
the following
piB
2w
=
θA
4
r 4(8n 4 + 16n 3 − 8n 2 − 16n 2r − 24n 3r − r 2 + 8n 2r 2 − nr 3)
64t(nr + 1) (4n − r)2 . (33
CSA
2w
= θA
4
n
2
r
2(16n 2 − 8nr − 16n 2r + 16n 3r + r 2 + 20nr 2 + 8n 2r 2 − 8n 3r 2 + 4n 4r 2
−4r 3 − 9nr 3 + 6n 2r 3 + 5n 3r 3 + 3r 4 + 2nr 4)/(16t(nr + 1)2 (4n − r)2); (34
CSB
2w
= θA
4
n
2
r
3(4n − 8n 2 + 4n 3 + 5r + 6nr + 9n 2r − 16n 3r + 2r 2 + 7nr 2 + 20n 2r 2 + 16n 3r 2
−2r 3 − 4nr 3 − 8n 2r 3 + nr 4)/(16t(nr + 1)2 (4n − r)2). (35
SWA2w SWB2w,
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CLAIM 1. If the rich country is too small as compared to the poor country, one-way trade occurs
although two-way trade would be possible. Otherwise, if the dimension of the two countries is
the same, or the rich country is larger than the poor country, two-way trade generally obtains,
while one-way trade is observed only if the poor country is considerably poorer than the rich
country.
Consider first one-way trade. As for the first point, notice that in such a case the following
sequence of inequalities must hold:5
It can be easily established that for all admissible values of r and n. As for the first
inequality in (36), it can be established through numerical calculations that (i) if n=1/2,
(ii) if n=1, and (iii) if n=2,
All the claims that can be found in the remainder of the paper are based
on numerical simulations carried out by using the same three values adopted here for parameter
n. This amounts to investigating three major cases, namely those in which country A is (i) half
the size of country B; (ii) as large as country B; and (iii) twice as large as country B.
As for two-way trade, it turns out that the inequalities needed for this kind of trade to arise,
i.e., are satisfied for all admissible values of r (see Appendix C).
Consider now the preferences of firm A as for the kind of trade that may arise. By evaluating
the sign of
h > θB > k , θB = rθA. (36
θB > k
h > θB
h > θB h > θB∀r ∈ ]0, 0.341325[; ∀r ∈ ]0, 0.428007[;
∀r ∈ ]0, 0.466888[.
θB > h > k ,
∆piA
21w
= piA
2w
− piA
1w
, (37
5. The equilibrium values of h and k for both one and two-way trade are in Appendix C.
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it can be established that (i) if n=1/2, (ii) if n=1,
and (iii) if n=2, Thus, if n=1/2
and consequently r lies in the interval ]0,1/2], i.e., the rich country is half the size of the poor
country, but the richest consumers of the latter have a marginal willingness to pay that is at most
half the corresponding marginal willingness to pay of the richest consumers in the rich country,
then in principle two way trade is possible for but firm A is better off
under one-way trade, so that she will decide not to set her price low enough to allow for the
high-quality good to be purchased by consumers living in country B, since their number is not
sufficient to compensate for the loss due to the decrease in the price charged by firm A and her
consequent inability to appropriate a large share of consumer surplus in her domestic market.6
Mutatis mutandis, for the cases where n=1 or n=2, it can be claimed one-way trade shall occur
for or respectively. Notice that, since in such cases
the parameter range where one-way trade is possible overlaps that where firm A prefers not to
export to country B, the upper bounds of the intervals that I shall adopt in the following sections
are set according to the optimal behaviour of the high-quality firm.
6. One-way trade vs autarky
In this section, I shall proceed to the comparative evaluation of the equilibrium values of
individual and collective surpluses as well as the other relevant magnitudes under autarky and
one-way trade. Obviously, the comparison will be carried out taking into account that r must
lie within the relevant ranges established in the previous section, for n equal to 1/2, 1 or 2,
∆piA21w < 0 ∀r ∈ ]0, 1/2[; ∆piA21w > 0
∆piA21w > 0∀r ∈ ]0.328173, 0.913517[; ∀r ∈ ]0.39795, 1[.
r ∈ ]0.341325, 1/2],
r ∈ ]0, 0.328173[, r ∈ ]0, 0.39795[,
6. This is clearly due to the fact that there is no market segmentation, i.e., firms are assumed
to be unable to price discriminate between consumers in the two countries. For an analysis of
such a setting, though exclusively carried out under two-way trade, see Motta, Thisse and
Cabrales (1995).
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alternatively.7
To begin with, consider prices and quantities. The consequences of one-way trade on these
magnitudes is summarized by
CLAIM 2. While trade liberalization unambiguously lowers the price of the high-quality good,
the price of the low-quality good may change either way. Both firms sell larger quantities after
the opening of trade.
Define the following differences:
It is easy to verify that is always negative in the relevant range, independently of the
relative sizeof the two countries. As it could be expected from the outset, the competition implicit
in the opening of trade lowers the price of the high-quality good. A slightly different story must
be told about the price of the low-quality good. In fact, it turns out that if n=1/2, is positive
for all This means that the price of the low-quality good is bound to
increase after trade liberalization if country B is significantly poorer than country A. In the other
two cases (n=1 and n=2), is positive over the entire parameter range. As for quantities,
a quick exam suffices to conclude that both differences in (39) are positive, increasing and
∆pA
1wm
= pA
1w
− pA
m
, ∆pB
1wm
= pB
1w
− pB
m; (38
∆xA
1wm
= xA
1w
− xA
m
, ∆xB
1wm
= xB
1w
− xB
m
. (39
∆pA1wm
∆pB1wm
r ∈ ]0, 0.267952[.
∆pB1wm
7. However, this need will emerge only under a few circumstances. Fortunately, in most
cases no numerical simulations are required in order to establish the results I am going to expose
in what follows.
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convex in r over the relevant range.
Focus now on profits. Trade exerts opposite effects on the two firms’ performances, as
stated in
CLAIM 3. The opening of trade decreases the profit of the high-quality firm while it increases
that of the low-quality firm.
Again, define
It appears that is always negative. This result is intuitive and needs no further comments.
I can only add that the decrease in firm A’s profit after trade liberalization is increasing (in
absolute value) and concave in r, i.e., it becomes larger at a decreasing rate as the maximum
willingness to pay of the poor country gets closer to that of the rich country. This happens
because, as r increases, the varieties offered by the two firms becomes more similar, enhancing
thus price competition. As for , it is always positive, increasing and convex in r.
The consequences of free trade on consumer surplus and total welfare in the two countries
remain to be described.
CLAIM 4. Trade liberalization increases both consumer surplus and social welfare in the rich
country. The same generally holds for the poor country as well, with the exception that when
the latter is larger than the rich country, consumer surplus may be lower than in autarky.
The relevant magnitudes, and i=A,B, are defined according to the same
criteria adopted above. Trade, if only one-way, increases welfare as compared to autarky over
∆piA
1wm
= piA
1w
− piA
m
, ∆piB
1wm
= piB
1w
− piB
m
. (40
∆piA1wm
∆piB1wm
∆CSi1wm ∆SWi1wm,
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the whole admissible range of r in both countries. Analogously, it increases consumer surplus
in the rich country. The same holds for consumer surplus in country B, except when n=1/2. In
such a case, if Notice that, since is always
positive, any loss suffered by consumers is always more than compensated by the increase in
firm B’s profit.
7. Two-way trade vs autarky
I shall now focus on the setting where both varieties are traded. The procedure and methods
I shall adopt here are completely analogous to those explained in the previous section, so I can
proceed rather quickly. The parameter ranges within which the comparison between two-way
trade and autarky makes sense are: (i) if n=1, (ii) if n=2,
Notice that if n=1/2, in the viable range of parameters only one-way trade may occur (see section
5). As before, I start by treating prices and quantities.
CLAIM 5. Under two-way trade, prices are always lower and quantities are always larger than
under autarky.
Define:
as the differences between two-way trade and autarky, as far as prices and quantities are
concerned. It turns out that and for both countries over the whole admissible
range of parameters. This leads one to think that the consequences of two-way trade on producer
r ∈ ]2 − √3, 0.341325[.∆CSB1wm > 0 ∆WSB1wm
r ∈]0.328173, 1]; r ∈]0.39795, 1].
∆pi
2wm
= pi
2w
− pi
m; ∆xi
2wm
= xi
2w
− xi
m; i = A , B , (41
∆pi2wm < 0 ∆xi2wm > 0
18
and consumer surplus, and thus also on social welfare, should be clearcut. Actually, this is not
exactly the case, at least as far as firms’ profits are concerned. These results are summarized in
the following:
CLAIM 6. Two-way trade unambiguously decreases both firms’ profits if the two countries
have the same size. If the rich country is larger than the poor one, then trade increases the profit
of the high-quality firm if the poor country is sufficiently rich, while it increases the profit of
the low-quality firm under the opposite circumstances.
CLAIM 7. Two-way trade increases both consumer surplus and social welfare in both countries
as compared to autarky.
I take into account firstly the case where n=1, i.e., where both countries have the same
overall dimension, so that any market size-effect is ruled out. In such a case, it can be verified
that
for all admissible values of r. The results displayed in (42) are fully in line with intuition. Things
go a slightly different way if the rich country is larger than the poor country, e.g., if n=2. In such
a case, although one reaches the same conclusions as above as for consumer surplus and social
welfare, two-way trade happens to increase both firms’ profits in two distinct parameter ranges:
∆pii
2wm
= pii
2w
− pii
m < 0; ∆CSi
2wm
= CSi
2w
− CSi
m > 0; ∆SWi
2wm
= SWi
2w
− SWi
m > 0, i = A , B ,(42
∆piA
2wm > 0 iff r ∈]0.5877, 0.938364[; (43’
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Condition (43’) implies that the high-quality firm may profit from two-way trade roughly over
the upper half of the admissible range for r, while condition (43") says that the same happens
to the low-quality firm if her own domestic consumers are sufficiently poor as compared to
foreign consumers. The effect involving firm A can be given the following explanation: if the
poor country is smaller but not significantly poorer than the rich country, when trade opens firm
A, who sells a high-quality good, profits from a non-trivial increase in the demand for her product
by high-income consumers living abroad, while exactly the opposite happens to firm B. As for
the situation described by (43"), it may be thought to work like this: if the poor country is both
appreciably smaller and significantly poorer than the rich country, when trade opens the
low-quality firm’s profit increases because she is now able to serve a large number of relatively
richer consumers who cannot though afford to buy the high-quality good being sold by firm A.
On the contrary, the latter looses from trade because the increase in the overall market size and
demand is not sufficient to make up for the decrease in profits due to competition.
8. Two vs one-way trade
The comparison between two-way trade and one-way trade remains to be carried out.
Obviously, it shall be limited to the restricted range of parameters where both kinds of trade are
possible.
It has already been established in section 5 that the arising of one type of trade or the other
dependsupon the relative performance of the high-quality firmin these twosettings. In particular,
we know that if the rich country is considerably smaller than the poor country (n=1/2), two-way
trade shall not occur. This implies that the comparison between one and two-way trade is
∆piB
2wm > 0 iff r ∈]0.39795, 0.471026[. (43"
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meaningful only when the two country are of about the same size (n=1) or the rich country is
larger than the poor country (n=2).
As for prices’ and quantities’ behaviour in the two settings, I can state the following:
CLAIM 8. Both prices are lower under two-way trade than under one-way trade. The quantity
sold by the high-quality firm is higher under two-way trade, while that sold by the rival is higher
under one-way trade.
Again, define
One quickly checks that for both firms, while and over the entire
range of parameter r.
Furthermore, as far as the low-quality firm’s performance is concerned, the following
holds:
CLAIM 9. The low-quality firm is always better off under one-way trade than under two-way
trade.
This obtains by checking that
for all admissible values of r. Under two-way trade, the loss due to the competition by the
∆pi
21w
= pi
2w
− pi
1w; ∆xi
21w
= xi
2w
− xi
1w; i = A , B . (44
∆pi21w ≤ 0 ∆xA21w > 0 ∆xB21w < 0
∆piB
21w
= piB
2w
− piB
1w < 0 (45
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high-quality firm in country B, the low-quality firm’s home market, adds to the loss due to the
competitive regime associated with trade, so that firm B always prefers one-way trade.
The opposite preferences obviously characterize consumers living in both countries, since
is always positive. As for social welfare, while
is always positive, is positive for all values of r if the two countries have
the sime size (n=1), while, if n=2, two-way trade is socially preferable to one-way trade only if
country B is sufficiently rich, and precisely for r>0.49218. Otherwise, the loss suffered by the
low-quality firm outweighs the gain in terms of consumer surplus. Accordingly, I can finally
state
CLAIM 10. Two-way trade is preferable to one-way trade from the consumers’ viewpoint. The
same applies to social welfare in the rich country, while it holds for the poor country if the latter
is not excessively poor or small as compared to the rich country.
9. Conclusions and suggestions for future research
I have investigated the issue of free trade in vertically differentiated goods between two
countries characterized by different dimensions and income distributions, in a framework
suitable to describe North-South trade.
Several results have been derived. First, according to the relative size as well as wealth
of their respective domestic markets, firms may have conflicting interests as for (i) the opening
of trade, be that one or two-way, as against the autarkic status quo ante; and (ii) one vs two-way
trade. The conclusions that the model suggests in terms of consumer surplus and social welfare
are rather clearcut. Under both perspectives, trade is generally preferred to autarky and two-way
trade is preferred to one-way trade, since the former implies that duopolistic competition extends
to both countries, while in the latter the low-quality firms competes against the high-quality
∆CSi21w = CSi2w − CSi1w ∆SWA21w = SWA2w − SWA1w
∆SWB21w = SWB2w − SWB1w
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firm in the richer market while keeping her monopolistic position at home.
The present analysis can be extended and amended under several aspects. First, it has been
carried out under the hypothesis that firms set the quality of their respective products under
autarky, so that after trade liberalization they can only adjust prices. In a richer model, this could
be considered as the short run or impact effect of trade liberalization, letting firms reoptimize
with respect to quality thereafter.8 Alternatively, if one prefers to maintain the assumption that
quality must be set once and for all due to the existence of sunk costs, then it can be figured that
firms choose quality under autarky, anticipating that at some date trade shall open, so that they
set quality in order to maximize a discounted flow of profits over a time interval that stretches
beyond the time at which liberalization occurs. This would properly embed the analysis in a
dynamic perspective. Finally, the general setting presented here opens the way to the analysis
of strategic trade policy by the governments of the countries involved. Some instances of the
effects exerted by tariffs and quotas are already described by Krishna (1987, 1990) and
Lambertini and Rossini (1994), where it is shown that the introduction of a tariff on imports by
the rich country may benefit both firms and increase both countries’ welfare. The issue of export
rivalry on the world market between firms operating in countries characterized by different
levels of economic development is tackled by Chang and Kim (1989) and Chang and Chen
(1994). In these two papers, the firm operating in the developed country is appointed the
Stackelberg leadership, and the follower relies on an imported key input which is needed for
the production of a low-quality good that is exported to the world market. The authors establish
that the government of the developing country should either introducea tariff on the input imports
or tax its final good exports.
8. This is done by Motta, Thisse and Cabrales (1995) by introducing a convex adjustment
cost which is completely absent under autarky. However, this is not fully satisfactory, since it
seems to imply that firms face two different technologies under the two market regimes.
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Appendix
Appendix A. The behaviour of the social planner
A social planner sets both price (or quantity) and quality in order to maximize social
welfare, defined as the sum of producer and consumer surpluses:
where g=p/q. Differentiating (a1) w.r.t. p and q, one gets:
Substituting and simplifying,
while the equilibrium quantity amounts to These results imply that the social planner
supplies a quality that is twice as high as that of the profit-seeking monopolist, and sets price
equal to marginal cost, serving the whole population of consumers, instead of the richer half,
as the profit-maximizing monopolist would do. The divergence between a profit-maximizing
and a welfare-maximizing monopolist can also emerge when production involves variable
instead of fixed costs. The monopolist’s inefficiency under this respect has received wide
attention in the existing literature. The main references are Spence (1975) and Sheshinski (1976),
SW = pi + CS = px − tq2 + s ⌠⌡g
θ
(θq − p )dθ, (a1
psp = 0, qsp = θ
2
s
4t
. (a2
SWsp = θ
4
s 2
16t , pi
sp
= −
θ4s 2
16t , CS
sp
=
θ4s 2
8t , (a3
xsp = θs .
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Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Itoh (1983).
Appendix B. Social welfare under free trade
The levels of social welfare in the two countries under one and two-way trade are the
following:
i) One-way trade
ii) Two-way trade
SWA
1w
= θA
4
nr
2(32n 3 − 48n 2r + 64n 4r − 16n 2r 2 − 56n 3r 2 + 32n 5r 2 + 16r 3 + 32nr 3 + 8n 2r 3
−4n 4r 3 − 16r 4 − 20nr 4 − n 3r 4 + 4r 5)/(64t(4n − 4r + 4n 2r − nr 2)2); (a4
SWB
1w
= θA
4
r
4(32n 2 + 16n 3 + 12n 4 − 64nr − 32n 2r + 40n 3r + 8n 5r + 32r 2 + 16nr 2 − 60n 2r 2 + 8n 3r 2
+40n 4r 2 + 8nr 3 + 40n 4r 2 + 8nr 3 − 8n 2r 3 − 24n 3r 3 + 3n 2r 4)/(64t(4n − 4r + 4n 2r − nr 2)2); (a5
SWA
2w
= θA
4
n
2
r
2(48n 2 + 8nr + 64n 3r − 29r 2 + 16nr 2 + 48n 2r 2 + 32n 3r 2 + 32n 4r 2 − 16r 3
−70nr 3 − 40n 2r 3 − 4n 3r 3 + 12r 4 + 8nr 4 − n 2r 4)/(64t(4n − r)2 (nr + 1)2); (a6
SWB
2w
= θA
4
r
3(16n 3 − 32n 4 + 16n 5 + 12n 2r + 40n 3r + 44n 4r − 64n 5r − 8n 2r 2 − 4n 3r 2 + 96n 4r 2
+75n 5r 2 − r 3 − 32n 3r 3 − 56n 4r 3 − 2nr 4 + 12n 3r 4 − n 2r 5)/(64t(4n − r)2 (nr + 1)2). (a7
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Appendix C. Marginal willingness to pay of the indifferent consumers under one and
two-way trade
Provided firms do not modify their respective qualities after the opening of trade, the
locations of the consumers who are indifferent (i) between the two varieties, and (ii) between
buying the low-quality good or not buying at all, are not invariant with respect to the kind of
trade observed, since prices are different under one and two-way trade. The two values of the
marginal willingness to pay identifying these consumers are h and k. Under one-way trade, they
correspond to:
Under two way trade, they are
It immediately appears that h2w>k2w for all admissible value of parameters. Furthermore, it is
quickly verified that
where
h 1w =
θA(2n − 2r + 2n 2r − r 2 − nr 2)
4n − 4r + 4n 2r − nr 2
; k 1w =
θAr(n + 2) (n − r)
4n − 4r + 4n 2r − nr 2
. (a8
h 2w =
θAr(n + 1) (2n − r)
(4n − r) (nr + 1) ; k
2w
=
θAr(n + 1) (n − r)
(4n − r) (nr + 1) . (a9
θB > h
2w iff r ∈]r1, r2[, (a10
r1 =
4n + 1 − √16n 2 + 9
2
, r2 =
4n + 1 + √16n 2 + 9
2
. (a11
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While the upper bound of the interval in (a10), i.e., r2, is always greater than two for all positive
values of n, the lower bound, r1, lies in the interval for
As a consequence, provided n>r and if n>1, as far as the analysis carried out in the
paper is concerned, the above condition must be considered as satisfied for
[(3 − √13)/2, (9 − √73)/2], n ∈ [1/2, 2].
r ∈]0, 1]
r ∈]r1, 1].
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Figure 1. One-way trade
Figure 2. Two-way trade
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